WEBINAR RECORDING · 2026-04
Ahmad Lashkaripour Global Tariff Dashboard
In this conversation: Ahmad Lashkaripour; moderator Ben Shepherd.
Ahmad Lashkaripour demonstrates a fast tariff-war model and public dashboard, then discusses what their results depend on: strategic retaliation, elasticities, welfare definitions, and production structure. The conversation makes clear why an accessible interface still needs careful economic interpretation.
Session information draws on the recording and its original description. Affiliations and policy context refer to the time of the webinar.
FROM THE CONVERSATION
Three takeaways.
What they mean in practice.
Prepared from the session recording using automatic transcription and editorial review. Follow the timestamp links for the original wording and context.
The cost of losing cooperation is different from the cost of autarky
Watch 06:24 ↗The model solves for the tariffs countries would choose when maximizing national welfare while taking others’ tariffs as given. Trade continues under this Nash equilibrium. Analytical best-response conditions replace repeated numerical optimization, making the counterfactual practical to explore across many specifications.
Policy interpretation: Use this scenario to examine the value of cooperation, but state the strategic behavior assumed. It is not a forecast that governments will choose those tariffs or immediately abandon cooperation.
Sensitivity is part of the result
Watch 27:20 ↗Lashkaripour shows that changing elasticities can reverse a country’s apparent gain from a global tariff war. The dashboard varies datasets, years, and elasticities; the companion US-tariff exercise also shows modeled US gains disappearing with retaliation in the illustrated scenario.
Policy interpretation: Present a range of defensible specifications and retaliation assumptions, rather than selecting one attractive map. Reproduce consequential results in the downloadable package and retain the chosen inputs.
Input-output extensions bring substantive assumptions
Watch 55:12 ↗In the closing Q&A, Lashkaripour explains that his analytical input-output extension assumes firms fully use duty drawback on imported inputs embodied in exports. Without that assumption, some tariff incidence reaches foreign consumers through re-exports, changing optimal-policy calculations. He expects production networks principally to amplify welfare effects in the extension discussed.
Policy interpretation: Check institutional assumptions about tariff rebates before applying a model to a country. Adding production networks is not just a software upgrade: implementation details affect the economic experiment.
From the discussion
At 41:22–44:11, Shepherd asks whether observed tariffs resemble Nash behavior; Lashkaripour distinguishes US tariff choices from partners possibly waiting out temporary measures. At 45:05–48:18, they discuss profit shifting and the numerical instability that scale economies can introduce. At 49:14–50:35, Lashkaripour defines welfare as nominal income, including tariff revenue, divided by the model’s consumer price index. These qualifications help prevent reading dashboard results as unconditional forecasts.
Recording references
- Recording: cooperation and Nash tariffs — 06:24–13:04
- Recording: robustness and retaliation — 27:20–29:31; 34:14–37:35
- Recording: duty drawback and production networks — 55:12–57:32
